State of Utah v. Philip E. Hollen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Philip E. Hollen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; attorney general; Scott Keith Wilson; Assistant Attrney General; Steven V. Major;
Deputy Davis County Attorney; attorneys for apellee.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold & Wiggins; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Hollen, No. 971018 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1275
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 971018-CA 
vs. 
PHILIP E. HOLLEN 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, AND AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE, PRESIDING. 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
Arnold & Wiggins 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEVEN V. MAJOR 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah court of Aopeafe 
NOV 1 7 M9 
JuKa D'Alesandro 
Clerk of the Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 971018-CA 
vs. 
Priority No. 2 
PHILIP E. HOLLEN : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, AND AGGRAVATED KIDNAPING, 
A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE, PRESIDING. 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SCOTT L. WIGGINS STEVEN V. MAJOR 
Arnold & Wiggins Deputy Davis County Attorney 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South Attorneys for Appellee 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN 
DECIDING NOT TO FILE A PRETRIAL MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EYEWITNESSES' IDENTIFICATIONS, AS 
COUNSEL HAD STRONG STRATEGIC REASONS FOR 
NOT FILING A MOTION, AND THERE WAS NO REASONABLE 
PROBABILITY OF SUPPRESSING THE STRONG WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATIONS 11 
A. Defendant's trial counsel fully considered the advantages 
and disadvantages of filing a Ramirez motion 12 
B. A motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications would 
not have been successful 14 
1. Opportunity and capacity to observe 15 
2. Non-suggestiveness of the photograph identification 
procedure 17 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. COUNSEL'S CONCURRENCE WITH DEFENDANT'S 
DECISION NOT TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 19 
A. Counsel's advice not to testify was well-founded 19 
B. Counsel's advice did not affect defendant's prior decision 
not to testify, and did not prejudice defendant 22 
III. DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR 
NOT REQUESTING AN INSTRUCTION ON A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE SINCE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION 
WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPROPER AS HAVING NO FACTUAL 
BASIS, AND WOULD HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE 24 
CONCLUSION 27 
ADDENDUM A - Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1995) 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994) 22 
STATE CASES 
Commonwealth v. Levia, 431 N.E.2d 928 (Mass. 1982) 16 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) 2, 14 
State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439 (Utah 1996) 22, 23, 24 
State v. Banner, 1X1 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) 21 
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998) 2 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) 18 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998) 12, 14, 19 
State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998) 14, 16, 24 
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996) 11, 12 
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 1997) 26 
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1992) 17 
State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924 (Utah App. 1998) 25 
State v. Payne, 964 P.2d 327 (Utah App. 1998) 26 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995) 26 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) 11, 15, 17, 18 
State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218 (Utah 1995) 17 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995) 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1998) 1, 2, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1995) 2, 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1994) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah R. Evid 609 21 
iv 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 971018-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
PHILIP E. HOLLEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction on one count of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1994), and one count of 
aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not moving to suppress 
eyewitness identification testimony? 
2. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in advising defendant regarding 
his right to testify at trial? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not requesting a jury 
instruction on a lesser included offense of unlawful restraint? 
"Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law and 
fact." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) {citing Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984). The trial court conducted a hearing and made 
findings of fact with regard to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "In ruling on an ineffective 
assistance claim following a Rule 23B hearing, 'we defer to the trial court's findings of 
fact, but review its legal conclusions for correctness.'" State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 
285, 289 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 531 (Utah App. 
1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995) (aggravated kidnaping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (1995) (unlawful restraint) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of aggravated robbery, aggravated 
kidnaping, and aggravated assault (R.6). The trial court dismissed the aggravated 
assault charge (R.24), and a jury convicted defendant on the aggravated robbery and 
aggravated kidnaping charges (R. 19-20). The trial court sentenced defendant to two 
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concurrent prison terms of five years to life (R.18), and defendant timely appealed 
(R.28). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the evening and early morning of June 24 and 25, 1995, defendant and his co-
defendant Jeffrey Mecham robbed the Cinemark Movie 10 theater in Lay ton, Utah. 
During the final movie showings of the night, defendant and Mecham gathered the 
theater employees at gunpoint and took them up to the manager's office. They forced 
the manager to remove the cash from the safe and bound the employees' hands and feet 
with packing tape before they left. 
The theater employees were initially shown a photograph array containing the 
photograph of Michael Cantue, who was then a suspect. Although several employees 
picked Cantue's photograph out as resembling one of the robbers (R. 106-110), none of 
the employees identified Cantue as the robber in a live lineup (R. 112-113). The police 
later showed the employees another photograph array containing a photograph of 
another suspect, Dennis Dougherty, but none of the employees identified anyone out of 
that array (R. 115-116). 
Defendant and Mecham were later identified by the police as possible suspects, 
and two separate photograph arrays were prepared (R. 116). The photograph arrays 
were presented to the witnesses as two piles of loose photographs, and the witnesses 
were allowed to shuffle through them and lay them out on a table in random order. 
3 
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The photograph arrays were shown to five of the employees,1 all of whom identified 
defendant as one of the men who robbed the theater (R. 118-123). These same five 
theater employees likewise identified defendant at trial: 
Heidi Maroney. Heidi was working in the concession stand at the theater that 
evening, and during the final movie showings was cleaning the concession area along 
with Kristin Rogers and Megan Brimhall (R. 173). Defendant came into the kitchen 
area with a gun, and Heidi looked at him for two or three seconds before defendant told 
her to turn around (R. 177, 180). Defendant had a gauze bandage covering part of his 
face (R.178). Heidi remembered having seen him when he had come into the theater 
an hour before, and had wondered what was wrong with his face (R. 179-80). Heidi 
had at that time discussed defendant's appearance with Megan, and had watched him 
cross the lobby, for five to ten seconds (R.180). 
Defendant took Heidi, Kristin, and Megan upstairs to the manager's office at 
gunpoint (R. 182-84). Defendant forced Heidi and the others to kneel on the floor of 
the manager's office, and bound them with packing tape while the robbery was 
completed (R.186). 
1
 There were two other employees working that night who were unavailable as 
witnesses: Kristin Rogers and Steve Nearing were both out of state at the time of the 
trial (R. 107, 109). 
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When Heidi was shown the first photograph array, she identified Cantue as 
"very similar" to the robber she had seen, but did not think it was him (R.189, 192). 
She then saw the live lineup with Cantue, and did not identify him or anyone else 
(R. 189-90). Heidi was later shown the second photograph array with Dougherty, but 
she did not recognize any of the photographs (R. 190). The police then showed her a 
third photograph array with defendant's photograph, and Heidi identified defendant as 
the robber with the gauze patch (R. 191). Heidi also identified defendant at trial 
(R.191). 
Megan Brimhall. Megan was cleaning the concession area during the final 
movie showings of the evening (R.196). At some point, she went back to the kitchen 
area where Heidi and Kristin were working (R.201). Defendant was there holding a 
gun, and he told Megan to look down (R.202). Before turning away from him, Megan 
looked at him for four to five seconds in a brightly lit area (R.202, 205). She saw the 
gauze patch on his face and remembered having seen him earlier when he had come 
into the theater. At that time, Megan had noticed the gauze and commented on it to 
Heidi. Megan had watched defendant for a minute or two as he walked through the 
lobby (R.203-04). 
When shown the photograph array that included Cantue's photograph, Megan 
thought that Cantue resembled the gunman, causing her to jump back (R.213). 
However, when she saw Cantue in person during a lineup, she knew that he was not the 
5 
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man who robbed the theater (R.214). Megan was shown the Dougherty photograph 
array, and did not identify anyone (R.214). When she was shown the two photograph 
arrays with photographs of defendant and Mecham, she had no trouble identifying both 
defendant and Mecham as the robbers (R.215). Megan also identified defendant and 
Mecham at trial (R.211,212). 
Mark Mudrow. As the theater assistant manager, Mark was upstairs in the 
theater office with Nicole George during the final movie showing of the night, counting 
the box office receipts of the day (R. 151). Nicole answered a knock at the door; the 
three concessions workers-Heidi, Kristin, and Megan-came in, followed by defendant, 
who was holding a gun (R. 152). Mark recalled having seen defendant earlier in the 
evening when defendant had entered the theater, taking note of him because of the 
gauze patch on his face (R. 154). Defendant ordered Mark to open the safe, and they 
briefly discussed its contents (R. 155). Although defendant told him to look away, 
Mark looked at defendant repeatedly, for a combined total of about thirty seconds 
(R. 156-57). As assistant manager, Mark had been trained to comply with any requests 
by a robber, but to look carefully in order to get a description and be able to identify 
them. Mark therefore paid attention to defendant's appearance (R. 158). The office 
was well lit and small; Mark was generally only about six or seven feet away from 
defendant (R. 157, 163). 
6 
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The police showed Mark the photograph array with Cantue's photograph, and 
Mark felt that some faces looked familiar, but did not identify anyone as the robber 
(R. 166). Mark was also shown the live lineup with Cantue, but did not identify anyone 
(R.166). Mark was shown the Dougherty photograph array, but did not identify 
anyone (R. 116). When he was shown the photograph arrays with defendant and 
Mecham, Mark identified defendant as the robber with the gauze on his face (R.167). 
Mark also identified defendant at trial (R.167). 
Nicole George. Nicole was upstairs in the theater office counting the money 
with Mark Mudrow when defendant brought the three concession workers upstairs at 
gunpoint (R.246). Nicole watched from about five or six feet away as defendant 
entered the office with a gun (R.247). As an assistant manager, Nicole had also been 
trained to cooperate during a robbery, but to get a description of the robbers (R.249). 
Nicole knew that she would be asked to describe the robbers and concentrated on being 
able to do that (R.255). While defendant was standing near Mark, forcing him to open 
the safe, Nicole stared at defendant for close to a minute, until defendant turned and 
saw her looking at him, and she then looked away (R.249). After he gathered the cash 
from the office, defendant ordered Nicole to go with him and open the downstairs door 
to the lobby (R.250). When Nicole opened the door, the second robber was standing 
there with his gun (R.251). He appeared startled to see Nicole and he pressed his gun 
against Nicole's forehead (R.251). He then pulled his turtleneck collar up over his 
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nose, but Nicole saw his face for five or six seconds (R.252). Nicole was then taken 
back up to the office (R.252). 
When shown the first photograph array, Nicole identified the photograph of 
Cantue as being similar to defendant, but stated that it was not him (R.109, 256). She 
was also shown the live lineup with Cantue, but did not identify anyone as the robber 
(R.256). Nicole was shown the Dougherty photograph array, but she did not see 
anyone familiar (R.257). When she was shown the two photograph arrays with 
defendant and Mecham, Nicole identified both as the robbers (R.258). Nicole also 
identified defendant and Mecham at trial (R.259,260) 
Nathan Nance. Nathan was a projectionist and usher at the theater (R.220). 
During the final movie showings of the evening, Nathan was with Steve Nearing, an 
usher (R.222). At one point, Nathan went to the restroom, and when he returned, he 
saw that no one was working in the concession stand, and could not find any of the 
other employees (R.223). After looking around, Nathan called out for Steve (R.225). 
Mecham leaned over an upstairs railing, pointed a gun at Nathan, and walked down the 
stairs (R.225). Mecham then took Nathan upstairs at gunpoint (R.227). Steve was 
already upstairs, and Mecham took both Nathan and Steve to the office, where they 
were bound with packing tape along with the other employees (R.228). 
Nathan did not see defendant during the robbery, but remembered seeing 
defendant come into the theater with the gauze patch on his face (R.233). Nathan did 
8 
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not recognize anyone out of the Cantue photograph array (R. 109, 230). Nathan 
likewise did not identify anyone out of the Dougherty photograph array (R. 116). When 
he was shown the two photograph arrays with defendant's and Mecham's photographs, 
however, Nathan identified both defendant and Mecham as the robbers (R. 122-23, 231-
32). Nathan also identified defendant and Mecham at trial (R.234). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Trial counsel's decision not to file a pretrial motion to suppress 
evidence of the eyewitnesses' identification of defendant from the photograph array was 
a reasonable tactical decision and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Counsel's decision was based upon a full investigation of the facts, including examining 
the photographs used, questioning the police regarding the procedures used for the 
photograph identification, and interviewing the witnesses regarding the strength and 
consistency of their identifications of defendant. Counsel correctly concluded that there 
was little likelihood of suppressing the identifications, and felt that filing the motion 
would have entailed significant risks, including the danger of further reinforcing the 
eyewitnesses' testimony. 
Defendant has also failed to show that a motion to suppress the identifications 
would have been successful, as the witnesses all had ample opportunity to observe 
defendant during the robbery, and the procedures used in conducting the photograph 
identification were not in any way suggestive. 
9 
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Point II. Counsel's advice to defendant not to testify at trial did not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel because that advice was correctly based upon a 
balancing of the pros and cons of such testimony. Counsel had reasonably concluded 
that his client was actually guilty of the crime, and defendant had not offered any 
explanation or defense which could be presented to the jury by way of his testimony, 
indicating that defendant would not make an effective witness. Further, defendant 
would also have been subject to damaging cross-examination which outweighed any 
possible advantages of having defendant testify, especially since defendant's testimony 
would have offered nothing more than a bald denial of guilt. Also, in light of the 
strong eyewitness testimony, defendant's testimony would not have altered the result of 
the trial, and thus defendant has failed to show any prejudice arising out of counsel's 
advice. 
Point III. Defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a 
jury instruction on the crime of unlawful restraint as a lesser included offense to 
aggravated kidnaping. Although unlawful restraint and aggravated kidnaping share 
common elements, under the facts of this case, the "restraint" of the victims was 
undisputably committed in the course of a robbery, and there is no rational theory for 
acquitting defendant of aggravated kidnaping and yet convicting him of unlawful 
restraint. In addition, counsel's decision not to ask for a lesser included instruction was 
10 
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a tactically correct decision, since the theory of the defense was that defendant was 
misidentified, not that he did not intend to commit a robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN 
DECIDING NOT TO FILE A PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EYEWITNESSES' IDENTIFICATIONS, AS COUNSEL HAD 
STRONG STRATEGIC REASONS FOR NOT FILING A MOTION, 
AND THERE WAS NO REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF 
SUPPRESSING THE STRONG WITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in not filing a pretrial 
motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications, as allowed under State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). Brief of Appellant, pp. 23-24. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show 
(1) that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient; and (2) that there exists a 
reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, he would have obtained a more 
favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). However, defendant has failed to 
show that his trial counsel's carefully considered decision not to file a Ramirez motion 
was deficient, or that such a motion would, in fact, have been successful in suppressing 
the eyewitness testimony which formed the basis for defendant's conviction. 
11 
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A. Defendant's trial counsel fully considered the advantages and 
disadvantages of filing a Ramirez motion. 
In considering a claim that counsel was deficient, this Court will give trial 
counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions 
unless there is no reasonable basis for them. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 644 {citing Taylor v. 
Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 
App. 1998) ("we must be persuaded that there was a 'lack of any conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's actions'") {quoting State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 
App. 1989)). 
Defendant argues that counsel should have made a motion to suppress the 
eyewitness identifications, apparently based upon the assumption that simply because 
Ramirez provides that such a motion may be made, it should always be made. See 
Brief of Appellant, p. 25 (trial counsel "should request and thus require the trial court 
to make a preliminary determination as to the constitutional reliability of the eyewitness 
identification."). However, there are disadvantages to filing a Ramirez motion which 
must be weighed carefully against the likelihood of obtaining a favorable result. 
Defendant fails to consider such reasons for not filing a Ramirez motion, and simply 
asserts that "the record does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would mitigate or 
ameliorate the deficiency." Brief of Appellant, p. 29. To the contrary, defendant's 
12 
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counsel testified at length at the Rule 23B hearing regarding the tactical reasons for his 
decision not to file the motion. 
First, counsel testified that he carefully evaluated the likelihood of prevailing on 
the motion, and concluded that the motion would be futile (R.521:24). He talked to the 
police detective about his procedures for conducting the photograph identification, 
examined the photographs, and hired an investigator to interview the witnesses 
regarding the basis and strength of their identifications (R.521:23). Based upon this 
investigation, he concluded that the identification procedure was not unfairly suggestive 
(R.521:22-24). 
Second, counsel testified that a Ramirez hearing would likely have harmed 
defendant's case at trial. The trial court's Rule 23B findings state that "[defendant's 
counsel] felt that the filing of such a motion would only have the effect of educating the 
prosecution more about his theory of defense and give already strong identification 
witnesses yet another chance to rehearse their testimony and further solidify their 
identification of Mr. Hollen." Finding of Fact # 32 (R.515). See also Transcript of 
Rule 23B Hearing, p. 41 (R.521:41) ("I wanted the prosecutor to spend as little time as 
possible on this case, hoping he would be less prepared for trial."). 
The record shows that defendant's trial counsel fully considered the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of filing a Ramirez motion, and made a reasonable 
tactical decision not to do so. "Since 'conceivable tactical bases' for defense counsel's 
13 
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actions are apparent and have some support in the record, and defendant has not 
overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance,' we must assume defense counsel acted 
competently." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 543-44 {quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 
579 (Utah App. 1993)). 
B. A motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications would not have 
been successful. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant has the burden of 
showing not only that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance, but also that 
"counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 
(Utah 1998). Counsel's failure to bring a motion that would have been futile does not 
constitute ineffective assistance. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 
1994). A motion to suppress the eyewitness identification testimony based upon 
Ramirez would have been futile because the factors cited in Ramirez as relevant to the 
issue all indicate that the eyewitness identifications in this case were reliable. 
Ramirez lists the following factors to consider in ruling on a motion to suppress 
an eyewitness identification: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) 
the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) 
the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical 
and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
14 
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the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 {quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493). These five factors 
generally fall into two categories: the ability of a witness to accurately identify a 
perpetrator, and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure used. The witness 
identifications in this case would not have been subject to suppression under Ramirez, 
as all five of the eyewitnesses had an adequate, and in some cases ideal, opportunity to 
observe defendant at the time of the robbery, and because the photograph identification 
procedure was not in any way suggestive. 
1. Opportunity and capacity to observe. Defendant asserts that that the 
witnesses had a "limited opportunity" to view him during the robbery, but supports this 
assertion only with fragmented, out-of-context quotes from the trial record, without 
attempting to consider the actual experience of any particular witness in looking at 
defendant on the night of the robbery. Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-26. For example, 
defendant misleadingly cites to fragments of Heidi Maroney's testimony ("pretty dark . 
. . not well lit" and "Facing the wall the entire time") which do not refer at all to the 
times and places when Heidi was looking at defendant's face. See Brief of Appellant, 
p. 26. In fact, Heidi testified that she saw defendant's face for several seconds in the 
well-lit kitchen, and remembered watching him walk across the lobby earlier, taking 
sufficient note of defendant to discuss his appearance with Megan Brimhall (R. 178-79). 
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Consequently, defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that a Ramirez 
motion would, in fact, have been successful. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. 
Contrary to defendant's unsupported characterization of the witnesses' 
opportunity to observe defendant, all the witnesses testified that they saw defendant's 
face for periods of time ranging from several seconds to minutes, generally up close 
and in brightly lit rooms. See R. 177-180 (Heidi Maroney); R.202-205 (Megan 
Brimhall); R. 156-58, 163 (Mark Mudrow); R.233 (Nathan Nance); R.249 (Nicole 
George). Although several of the witnesses acknowledged that they were afraid, there 
was no indication that their fear had any negative effect on their perceptions, and two 
of the witnesses emphasized that they were concentrating on being able to describe and 
identify the robbers, as they had been trained to do (R.158, 249, 255). Indeed, 
defendant's trial counsel fully investigated the witnesses' ability to identify defendant, 
and "felt that there was high level of certainty with regard to their identification." Rule 
23B Hearing Transcript, p. 40 (R.521:40). See generally Id., pp. 36-40 (counsel's 
analysis of the Ramirez factors as applied to these witnesses).2 
2
 Even if defendant had made a showing that some particular witness's 
identification was weaker than others, and could have been suppressed, there are valid 
tactical reasons for not filing a motion to suppress a weak identification when there are 
multiple identifications. See Commonwealth v. Levia, 431 N.E.2d 928, 933 (Mass. 
1982) (noting tactical decision not to suppress weaker identifications in order to seek 
spillover effect on the strong identifications from impeachment on cross examination of 
the weaker identifications). 
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This evidence contrasts with the eyewitness identification ruled admissible in 
Ramirez, where the witness identified a robber who was masked, crouched down in a 
shadowy area, and viewed from up to thirty feet away. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. See 
also State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness's "few 
seconds" observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted.). 
2. Non-suggestiveness of the photograph identification procedure. 
Defendant does not make any argument regarding the suggestiveness of the photograph 
identification procedure, which is one of the factors to be considered under Ramirez. 
See State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n. 1 (Utah App. 1992) (refusing to consider 
suggestiveness claim in absence of sufficient analysis or citation to authority). 
In fact, as defendant's trial counsel recognized, the procedures used for the 
photograph identification were not suggestive in any way (R.521:23-24). The 
photographs were given separately to each witness in a stack, and the witnesses were 
allowed to shuffle through them or lay them out in any order. This approach prevented 
the officer conducting the photograph identification procedure from in some way 
suggesting or emphasizing one photograph. Id. Defendant's counsel also examined the 
photographs used in the array, and did not find that the photographs themselves 
rendered the identification unfair (R.521:26-30). See R.475 (photo array of defendant). 
This procedure is to be contrasted to the "blatant suggestiveness" of the lineup 
procedure which was ruled to be admissible in Ramirez, in which a witness was 
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informed that a suspect matching the description had been found, and then was asked to 
identify defendant while he was handcuffed alone to a chain link fence and surrounded 
by police. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 777. 
In addition, prior to the photograph identification of defendant, the witnesses had 
all been shown multiple photograph arrays and one in-person lineup. As defendant's 
counsel observed, "it would be hard for the police to have been suggestive when they 
have shown them 18 pictures prior to this" (R.521:24). There is certainly nothing in 
the record to suggest that the photograph identification procedure was "something so 
distorted or tainted that in fairness and justness the guilt or innocence of an accused 
should not be allowed to be tested thereby." State v. Bruce 779 P.2d 646, 651 (Utah 
1989) {quoting State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972).3 
3
 Defendant also argues that the eyewitnesses' in-court identifications of him 
were "tainted" by the alleged viewing of defendant by some unspecified witness or 
witnesses at the preliminary hearing. Brief of Appellant, p. 27-28. However, no one 
objected to the in-court identifications, and defendant does not argue that counsel's 
failure to object constituted deficient performance or that allowing the in-court 
identifications was clear error by the trial court. Defendant's entirely unsupported 
factual assertion that an unknown witness's in-court identification was tainted is entirely 
irrelevant to the issue of whether counsel was deficient in failing to file a pretrial 
Ramirez motion. 
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POINT II 
COUNSEL'S CONCURRENCE WITH DEFENDANT'S DECISION 
NOT TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL DID NOT CONSTITUTE 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
In its Rule 23B findings of fact, the trial court found that from the beginning, 
defendant "told [his attorney] that he would not accept a plea bargain, that he wanted to 
go to trial, and that he would not testify." The trial court further found that, because of 
defendant's decision, his attorney spent little time discussing the matter. Defendant's 
counsel determined that it would be better for defendant not to testify, and defendant 
agreed with counsel's advice (R.516-17). At the time of trial, defendant acknowledged 
on the record that he did not want to testify (R.517). 
Defendant now argues that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance in 
advising him of the advantages and disadvantages of testifying. However, in making 
this argument, defendant fails to meet his burden of showing that counsel's advice not 
to testify was so faulty as to fall outside of "the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542. Further, defendant has failed to show that he 
was prejudiced by his counsel's advice. 
A, Counsel's advice not to testify was well-founded. 
Trial counsel did advise defendant not to testify (R.521:43). In the Rule 23B 
hearing, counsel testified that he based this advice on two grounds: (1) he had come to 
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the conclusion that defendant was, in fact, guilty; and (2) he anticipated that defendant 
would be impeached with prior convictions. 
Defendant now asserts that counsel's "unwarranted assumption" of guilt was an 
improper basis for advising defendant not to testify. Brief of Appellant, p.33. Far from 
being an "unwarranted assumption," counsel's conclusion that defendant was guilty 
was virtually unavoidable: aside from the unchallenged and consistent eyewitness 
testimony, counsel was also aware that defendant and Mr. Meacham had been either 
convicted or accused of a number of similar robberies. Most importantly, defendant 
himself never told his counsel that he was innocent (R.531:45). Defendant now asserts 
that his counsel's belief that defendant was guilty somehow "breached his duty of 
loyalty to his client." Brief of Appellant, p. 32. However, defendant does not cite to 
any rule requiring a defense attorney to believe in the factual innocence of his client. 
On the contrary, a trial attorney who treats a factually guilty client differently than a 
factually innocent one is grounding his strategy in reality rather than legal fiction. 
Defendant ignores the obvious implications of his attorney's conclusion that 
defendant was guilty. Aside from the ethical problems of an attorney advising a client 
to testify when he believes that the client will commit perjury, if counsel believes that 
his client is guilty and the client has not offered any reasonable explanation or defense, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the client will not be able to offer any such explanation 
or defense if he takes the stand, and will not make a very good witness. See Rule 23B 
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Hearing Transcript, p. 46 (R.521:46) ("He had nothing to offer. He had nothing to say 
that would help his case."). Indeed, defendant himself acknowledged that if he had 
testified he would have had nothing to offer other than a vague denial. "All I could 
have said was that I didn't do it. I wasn't there. To the best of my knowledge I have 
never attended a movie theater in Layton or Davis County" (R.521:69). 
Counsel also testified that a second reason for advising defendant not to testify 
was the fact that defendant had prior convictions which might be brought out on cross-
examination. Without any analysis, defendant asserts that counsel's conclusion on this 
issue was wrong, and that any prior convictions would have been excluded by the trial 
court, citing State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). However, under Banner and 
Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, the use of prior convictions in cross 
examination of a defendant is evaluated by conducting a balancing test, weighing the 
probative value of the evidence against possible prejudice. Defendant has not 
undertaken any such analysis in his brief, nor has he made a record of what prior 
convictions defendant had. Consequently, defendant has not provided any basis for this 
Court to evaluate this issue. 
Finally, prior convictions are not the only basis for cross-examination. By 
testifying, defendant would subject himself to questions and rebuttal testimony 
regarding any number of issues which would harm his case, including any alibi or 
explanation he offered in testifying. Perhaps most damagingly, by simple questioning 
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of defendant regarding his relationship with Mecham, the prosecution would have been 
able to make defendant's misidentification defense even less likely: defendant would 
then have had to show not only that the witnesses misidentified him, but that they 
actually misidentified one pair of associates for another similar-looking pair, while still 
identifying them in separate arrays. 
Accordingly, counsel's agreement with defendant's decision not to testify was 
reasonable: defendant had no exculpatory evidence to offer, and would have faced cross 
examination which would likely have significantly strengthened the prosecution's case. 
B. Counsel's advice did not affect defendant's prior decision not to 
testify, and did not prejudice defendant. 
Under Strickland, defendant has the burden of showing that "but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, defendant must show (1) that he would have 
testified, and (2) that his testimony would likely have affected the outcome of his trial. 
See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996). Defendant fails to cite a factual 
basis for a finding that either of these would have occurred. 
Defendant asserts in his brief that he "probably" would have testified if his 
counsel had properly advised him regarding his right to testify and had informed him 
that his prior convictions could not have been used in cross-examination. Brief of 
Appellant, p. 33. Significantly, however, the trial court did not find that defendant 
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would have testified under those circumstances; the only finding regarding defendant's 
intent is that defendant early on decided not to testify. R.516-517. 
In addition, even defendant's ambiguous assertion that he "probably" would 
have testified if told that his prior convictions would not be brought out on cross-
examination is not supported by the evidence which defendant cites. See Brief of 
Appellant, p.34. Defendant testified only that "I still would have, you know, taken the 
chance I guess and got up there and said what he wanted me to tell them." R.521:69. 
Defendant does not, therefore, assert that he would have testified but for his counsel's 
allegedly erroneous analysis of the likelihood that the prosecution would have been able 
to impeach him with his prior convictions. Rather, defendant testified only that he 
possibly ("I guess") would have testified if his counsel told him to do so. Even if 
counsel had concluded that defendant's prior convictions could not be used in cross 
examination, there is no basis for finding that counsel would then have advised 
defendant to testify; there were other significant reasons for advising defendant not to 
testify. See Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441 (lack of evidence to show that defendant would 
have decided to testify in the absence of counsel's allegedly bad advice). 
Finally, defendant does not make any reasonable showing that his testimony 
would have altered the outcome of the trial. The evidence against defendant was 
substantial and essentially unchallenged. If defendant had testified, there is no reason 
to believe that he would have helped his case, as indicated in the analysis above 
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regarding the soundness of counsel's advice not to testify. See supra, Point II.A. 
Defendant himself stated at the Rule 23B hearing that if he had testified, "[a] 111 could 
have said was that I didn't do it." R.521:69. Such testimony is hardly likely to have 
undercut the evidence presented by the prosecution, and would only have served to 
emphasize to the jury the total lack of any rebuttal to that evidence. See State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (defendant failed to show that his proposed 
testimony would have altered the verdict); Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 441-42 ("Proof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a 
demonstrable reality.") (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). 
Accordingly, defendant has failed to show either that he would have testified if 
counsel had advised him differently concerning use of his prior convictions or that his 
vague denial of guilt would have altered the outcome of the trial. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
REQUESTING AN INSTRUCTION ON A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE SINCE SUCH AN INSTRUCTION WOULD HAVE BEEN 
IMPROPER AS HAVING NO FACTUAL BASIS, AND WOULD 
HAVE BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH THE THEORY OF THE 
DEFENSE 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury 
instruction on the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint. Brief of Appellant, 
p.34. As defendant points out, the offense of unlawful restraint, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
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5-304 (1995), is committed whenever a defendant "knowingly restrains another 
unlawfully." Such "restraint" is necessarily included in the crime of aggravated 
kidnaping, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1995), which is committed (as applied to this 
case) when the victim is seized, confined, detained, or transported in order to facilitate 
the commission of a felony. Defendant reasons that, since the elements of aggravated 
kidnaping necessarily include the elements of unlawful restraint, he was entitled to a 
lesser included instruction on unlawful restraint. 
This argument fails because the fact that unlawful restraint is a lesser included 
offense of aggravated kidnapping does not without more entitle defendant to a lesser 
included instruction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1995) provides that: 
The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense. 
See also State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924 (Utah App. 1998) (request for a lesser included 
instruction should be granted only if "a rational basis exists on which the jury could 
acquit the defendant of the offense charged while convicting him of the alternative 
offense.") (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)). 
Accordingly, an instruction on the lesser included offense would not be 
mandated unless there was a reasonable basis for a jury to acquit defendant of the 
greater offense of aggravated kidnaping but convict him of the lesser offense of 
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unlawful restraint. Under the facts of this case, there was no reasonable basis for such 
a verdict. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to defendant, the 
unlawful restraint proven at trial unquestionably occurred to facilitate a robbery. No 
reasonable interpretation of the evidence would support a finding that defendant 
"restrained" the theater employees, and yet did not do so in furtherance of the robbery. 
In addition, regardless of the legal availability of a lesser included instruction, 
defendant's counsel would have had a valid tactical reason not to request it: the 
instruction would have conflicted with defendant's own theory of the case, which was 
misidentification, not lack of intent to commit a robbery. See State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 
712, 723 (Utah App. 1997) (failure to request a lesser included instruction was not 
ineffective assistance because the instruction would have been inconsistent with trial 
strategy); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (defendant received 
effective assistance because jury instruction on lesser crime "would have been wholly 
'incompatible'" with trial strategy, which relied on the defense of misidentification). 
Finally, even if a lesser included instruction on unlawful restraint was 
appropriate and tactically desirable, defendant has the burden of showing that the 
verdict would have been different if the instruction had been given. State v. Payne, 964 
P.2d 327, 334 (Utah App. 1998) (no error if "the evidence of the greater offense was so 
strong that there is no substantial likelihood of a different outcome had the requested 
instruction been given."). Defendant has made no effort to do so here. 
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Accordingly, counsel did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to 
request an instruction on unlawful restraint, and defendant has failed to show that he 
was prejudiced by his counsel's judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ££_ day of November, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping. 
" * ^ n hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel 
in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or 
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(e) to commit a sexual offense as described in Part 4 of this chapter, 
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be the result of force, threat, or deceit 
if the victim is mentally incompetent or younger than sixteen years and the 
detention or moving is accomplished without the effective consent of the 
victim's custodial parent, guardian, or person acting in loco parentis to the 
victim. 
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a felony of the first degree punishable by a term 
which is a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of 5,10, or 15 years and 
which may be for life, 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-302, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-302; 1974, ch. 32, § 12; 
1983, ch. 88, § 15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Sentence. 
Sentence0111^4 0^nSeS' -Constitutionality. 
^Constitutionality.
 A
 T h e agfava ted k i d n a P i n S minimum manda-
TjnhplH *ory sentencing provision is constitutional. 
Cited S t a t e v' R u s s e l l> 7 9 1 R 2 d 1 8 8 ( U t a h 1 9 9 0 ) 
Lesser included offenses. —Upheld. 
Defendant charged with aggravated kidnap- Concurrent 15-year minimum mandatory 
ing was entitled to a jury instruction on assault sentences for aggravated kidnapping and ag-
as a lesser included offense since there was gravated sexual assault found not cruel and 
sufficient overlap in elements of two offenses unusual punishment. See State v. Russell, 791 
and if jury had accepted defendant's version of p.2d 188 (Utah 1990). 
evidence, however unlikely that might have 
been, it could have voted to acquit him of Cited in State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621 
aggravated kidnaping and to convict him of (Utah 1987); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 
assault. State v. Brown, 694 R2d 587 (Utah (Utah 1989); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 
1984). (Utah 1993). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Kidnapping § 1. of statutes increasing penalty for kidnaping 
A.L.R. — What is "harm" within provisions where victim suffers harm, 11 A.L.R.3d 1053. 
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76-5-304. Unlawful detention. 
(1) A person commits unlawful detention if he knowingly restrains another 
unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with his liberty. 
(2) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-304, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-304. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS offense of kidnaping a minor, § 76-5-301. State 
v. Cross, 649 R2d 72 (Utah 1982). 
Elements. 
uibttit^l* e^ce°officer Liability of peace officer. 
C'ted ' ^ peace officer would not necessarily be held 
liable for mistaking identity of person named in 
Elements. warrant of arrest if he had exercised reasonable 
For cases discussing definition and elements diligence and care in ascertaining identity be-
of former offense of false imprisonment, see fore he served warrant. Mildon v. Bybee, 13 
Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653,1912B Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962). 
Ann. Cas. 1366 (1910); Mildon v. Bybee, 13 
Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962). C i t e d i n S t a t e v- James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 
Kidnaping a minor. 
Unlawful detention is not a lesser included 
1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Impris- or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165. 
onment § 151. Penalties for common-law criminal offense of 
C.J.S. — 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 71. false imprisonment, 67 A.L.R.4th 1103. 
A.L.R. — Excessiveness or inadequacy of Key Numbers. — False Imprisonment «=» 
compensatory damages for false imprisonment 43. 
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